IsiXhosa Intellectual Traditions (IsiXIT) Digital Archive

THE EXPEDITION. DEMONSTRATING or govern- ing by panic in connection with the Bechuanaland imbroglio has proved very serviceable indeed. It is not very long ago that every lover of good morals in Govern¬ments as well as in individuals was beginning to stand aghast at the baneful activity of some of the citi¬zens of the South African Republic in the direction of robbing Native chiefs by specious promises, these unavailing, by despoiling them outright, and forming what migh be appropriately called a cordon,t from coast to coast, to bar the march of the just and humane influence of Great Britain. What served, to a great extent, to make the situation most distressing was the existence of a school of political thought in South Africa which held tenaciously to the belief that the predominance of the Imperial Power, hailing from the British Isles, was the only ob¬stacle in the way of the arrival of the millennium in South Africa. No attempt has ever been made by the apostles of this doctrine to show how this magnificent end could be compassed. The doctrine has, of its such the fol- and the abuse of Representative Insti- tutions, stirred up by an ignorant, though none the less well-meaning majority. Surely no one desires such a contingency. It is, never-theless, just what would ensue di¬rectly the aegis of Great Britain were withdrawn from us. When, a few short months back, an idea was beginning to take hold of a section of the people here that England cared not two straws for the Colonies, droves of filibusters at once started, left as large a country as the Transvaal very sparsely peopled, possessed them-selves of the land of the Natives simply because they knew them to be weak and helpless, created vest¬ed rights, and complicated the sit¬uation. The Colony was powerless to check these depredations, for, with more than half its population being blood relations of the free¬booters it was not possible for it to cording to the requirements of justice without exciting race feeling and promoting a civil war. All this is wholly beyond the region of possibility if the Imperial Govern¬ment has a voice in our affairs, and for this special problem, at any rate, we heartily believe in the utility of the formula—' prevention is better than a cure '—being employed in its solution. Sir CHARLES WARREN'S expedi¬tion is a cure for the consequences of the infatuation of tabooing the influence of the QUEEN in these her remote possessions, and nothing will keep things straight out here but the maintenance of that influence We notice with satisfaction that this fact has already dawned upon the mind of the British public ; for we find The Spectator has grasped the situation when it observes, with truth and force, that ' There is no evidence whatever that the instant the pressure is withdrawn the fili-busters will not advance again, and revive the same situation. They hunger for land, they do not believe the natives have any rights except to toil for white men, and they think the British Government, even if irresistible, will only interfere intermittently. They, therefore, cannot be trusted, but must be watched ; and it becomes a question whether the Mother-country should not materially modify its attitude, and either shorten its boundaries or establish some system of defence which will work automatically. The former plan ought, in our judgment, to be thoughtfully considered, for it is certain that the embarrassments caused by our ill-defined position will not for many years to come seriously diminish. We are, infact, respon- sible for a general protection of the natives throughout a huge region, which grows bigger as it grows more inaccessible, widen¬ing out for ever to the North, and which is threatened perpetually by a fighting white clan permanently at war with the popula. tion. That is the true situation, and it is unendurable. It oan be terminated only by one of two alternatives,—the surrender of the whole region to the Dutchmen, with all the consequences that act involves, or the maintenance of a garrison strong enough, mobile enough, and independent enough, to en- force order until, in the inevitable progress of events, the English colonists and gold-seekers shall be strong enough to upset any local rule but their own. The first alternative will probably be rejected by opinion, which is unfavourable to surrenders, and friendly to the dark tribes; and the second ought, therefore, to be adopted with decision. We ought to maintain such a force in the north¬ern portion of South Africa as will enable us to keep our engagements, hold the Free Republics to theirs, and prevent these per¬petually recurring demands for costly and unfruitful expeditions. The force need not be a large one, for it would have the sympathy of the British Colonists; it might be raised in great part locally, and it might be aided by disciplined native auxiliaries. We do not believe it would cost a tithe of the sum we now expend on expeditions, while it could be steadily employed in pursuance of a defined policy by a High Commissioner, as we have preferred to call him, a Viceroy, whom the direct control of all natives of all questions in dispute among the states of South Africa should be entrusted. We know quite well how disagreeable this plan is to a Government wisely anxious to reduce its liabilities, and to those Radicals who think the country already over-weighted ; but the facts are not the less hard because they are disagreeable. We are bound by our pledges and by humanity to rule in South Africa, at least, when natives are concerned, or to retire; and owing to the conduct of the Boers, there is no ruling without the support of a paid force. We might as well try to protect Bond Street without police, the natives' lands being as attractive to Boers as the jewellers' shops to the criminal class. We do not make the attempt in any other country with a mixed population, and it is a futile one in South Africa.